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In this project, I elucidate the presence of Aristotelian political friendship within Thomas 
Jefferson's ideal American regime. The project considers the aspects of Aristotle's political thought 
that are relevant to political friendship, and draws parallels to Jefferson's political philosophy 
through: (1) the organization of the regime and its citizens (the constitution and construction of 
the regime, the class demographics of its citizens, etc.); and (2) the philosophical principles that 
inform the aim(s) and end (telē) of the regime.  
Despite notable differences between their political philosophies--such as Jefferson's 
inclusion of Christian moral philosophy in his thought--I conclude that Jefferson's attempts to 
harmonize the salient aims of modern liberalism and classical republicanism is what creates the 
space for Aristotelian political friendship in Jefferson's conceptual regime.  
 
Introduction 
 There is a predominant view that Aristotelian political thought has been made moot by 
the evolutions of the Moderns, such as Hobbes and Locke. Classical republicanism held that the 
primary aim of the regime ought to be the cultivation of a virtuous citizenry, through political 
participation within a mutually understood common aim, which allowed each citizen to live well. 
This has been altered by modern liberalism's understanding of a more limited regime: a 
government ought to be designed only to protect each individual's natural rights and liberties, 
with political participation and cooperation set aside for this protection of the individual and the 
pursuit of their own interests. The implications of this change of aims, are far reaching and 
pervasive: have we moved beyond the ancients; is there nothing else left to learn from them? To 
leave these questions and others like it unanswered would be greatly harmful to our 
understanding of our current political context(s) and construction(s), and of our nature as human 
beings. Where could one go, then, to look well and take stock of this, while also answering our 
primary question?  
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The American Revolution is  a microcosm of political philosophy unlike any other. In it, 
we may observe the philosophical roots (both classical and modern) that motivated it, and thus 
see with clarity the prudent approaches of its founding statesmen in creating a well-founded 
regime. Thomas Jefferson is, among his contemporaries, the closest to what one may call a 
political philosopher. His public and private writings demonstrate that he had long ruminated on 
the nature of man and politics: what makes a good regime; what constitutes a good life; what 
ought to be the aim of the government? Jefferson believed in a unique republicanism, one that 
can be called his own. Much like classical republicanism, Jeffersonian republicanism saw its 
citizens as willing and able to self-govern. This is made possible by their capacity for virtue, 
mutual self-respect of each others' rights, and a love of liberty - all of which are grasped through 
political cooperation and self-governance. These citizens would necessarily share an 
understanding of their common wants and common aims, allowing each to deliberate well about 
what is best for both themselves and what is shared.   
These essential ideas appear to have strong parallels to Aristotelian political thought. A 
notable difference comes with Aristotle holding political friendship (politikē philia), specifically, 
as a central feature of what makes a good regime. It, in short, is generative to harmony and like-
mindedness (homonoia) among citizens, and thus helps to sustain the peaceful self-governance 
of the regime. Political friendship, in tandem with a virtuous citizenry with well-aimed civic 
practices, makes possible the self-governance -- and the living well -- of citizens 
It can be difficult to discern parallels between Aristotle and Jefferson, within the latter's 
political and philosophical thought. Some argue that, on a larger scale, friendship among citizens 
was not even indirectly present as a goal of the Founding, for "no theorist of the modern period 
explicitly argued that furthering philia is a primary function of the state" (Schwarzenbach 1996, 
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108). Others agree that Jefferson's political and ethical thought is firmly attributable to Locke, 
Hume, Sydney, and other Modern thinkers (Appleby 1976; Erkkila 2007). Did Jefferson, being a 
Modern thinker, not see value in the cultivation and use of friendship among citizens? On the 
contrary, I argue that Jeffersonian political thought, and its focus on social cooperation and 
cultivation,  invites strong parallels between it and Aristotelian political friendship. Nonetheless, 
there is an absence of scholarship concerning a comparative analysis of the relevant concepts 
between these men. 
I aim to make clear the features in Jefferson's republican political thought and ideal 
American regime that are analogous to Aristotelian political friendship, and are conducive to it, 
such as: the virtue of prudence as necessary and conducive to those relationships, and the use of 
deliberative rhetoric as the public exercise of prudence within a self governing citizenry. When 
parallels can be found, they will offer scholars and citizens alike a more nuanced understanding 
of our relationships and obligations to each other in the regime. Also, and perhaps more 
importantly, finding paralles would help to answer whether or not we can continue to learn from 





Political friendship (politikē philia) is a multifaceted concept, and Aristotle is scarce 
providing an explicit explanation of its nature and uses. It must be gleamed from across the 
Politics, the Nicomachean Ethics, and the Rhetoric. Also, in order to properly grasp the many 
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features that contribute to its makeup, we must investigate the political and ethical context(s) and 
components required for it to come about.  
The superior or architectonic tele (End) for human beings, towards which all of our 
actions ought to aim, is Happiness (NE 1094a1-3); or, more accurately, flourishing (eudaimonia). 
Essentially, eudaimonia can be defined as human action (praxis), in accordance with virtue, over 
a complete life (Balot 2015, 111; Frank 2005, 141). From this it is clear that the pursuit and 
practice of virtue is a fundamental requisite for the Good Life of eudaimonia. All virtues, 
intellectual or moral, exist in the middle point between the excess and deficiency of "emotion, 
desire, [and/or] action" (Balot 2015, 112; NE 1103a15-12; 1104a12-26). One must habituate 
virtue so as to live and act within the mean, but also to maintain such virtue throughout their 
lives (Frank 2005, 141).  
The best form of regimes is quite similarly aimed. For Aristotle, the best regimes are so 
designated because of their eudaimonic constitutions (Balot 2015, 105-109; Frank 2005, 141-
142), meaning that their ethical and political structures are aimed to provide the best possible 
space for the cultivation of "those [virtues] of a public and private life" (Balot 2015, 114). In 
other words, the best regimes are those which are aimed at the cultivation of virtue and the 
flourishing of its citizens. 
A necessary virtue needed to grasp both the best human life and the best regime - and 
also political friendship - is prudence (phronēsis). To be prudent, one must be "skilled in aiming, 
in accord with [reason], at what is best for a human being in things attainable through action," 
which is invariably tied to virtue and eudaimonia (NE 1141b10-17). How would one be able to 
discern the difference between one's own good(s) and those that are shared in the political 
community? The knowledge of what is good or bad for ourselves is closely tied to moderation, in 
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that the latter is "a sort of self knowledge" of both one's own limits and goods, but also of "the 
limits of his capacity to know what is good for someone else" (Frank 2005, 93-94). It is this self-
knowledge of one's own limitation of knowledge, accompanied with a desire to secure one's own 
good, that comprise the essence of prudence and help to harmonize both private and public 
interests.  
Political friendship, as an amalgam of these features of the regime, can be seen as a set of 
public relationships, which are moored in mutual self-respect and "an egalitarian attitude based 
on the knowledge of how to rule and be ruled" (Balot 2015, 112). Likewise, through the virtue of 
prudence1, citizens take on "an enlarged outlook that avoids class-based hatreds and encourages 
a willingness to take the perspective of others" (Balot 2015, 112). Political friendship is thus a 
virtue of character, possessed individually but focused outwardly. Political friendship, with its 
egalitarian character and capability to reduce faction (stasis) in the regime in service to harmony 
(homonoia) (Frank 2005, 138), is thus necessary for the well-being of the best regimes. Moreso, 
it is conducive to a shared understanding of common aims (koinonia agathon), and even to 
securing justice through the reciprocity (antipeponthōs) through a citizenry of similars.2 So arises 
the political place and function of politikē philia: a necessary feature for the best regimes to 
reach towards their eudaimonic telōs, while also being a byproduct of such a eudaimonic 
constitution.  
Aristotle understood deliberative rhetoric (symbouleutikon rhētorikē) to be a key tool in 
promoting the private and public exercise of political friendship and its corresponding virtues. 
Like the temporally odd Aristotelian tele (Frank 2005, 141), deliberative rhetoric is used in the 
                                               
1 See Frank (2005), 93-95. 
2  See Balot (2015), Bickford (1997), Danzig (2000), Frank (2005), Schwarzenbach (1996), Scorza 
(2004), and Yack (2006) 
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present but with an exclusively futural focus. Just as a prudent person deliberates what is best for 
themselves, deliberation is the public exercise of determining the best action for the well-being 
of the community (Bickford 1996; Yack 2006). This necessarily requires a shared understanding 
of the aims of the regime (Bickford 1996; Ruderman 1997; Schwarzenbach 1997; Yack 2006), 
much like how the prudent person must have knowledge of the good at which their particular 
actions aim. This shared understanding comes about from the virtuous and prudent citizenry of 
the best regimes, eudaimonically constituted, who share in common the laws of their regime and 
a mutual moral concern for one another (Schwarzenbach 1996, 104). 
All of the aforementioned concepts seem almost too good to be true -- they seem to work 
too well, and not take into consideration the disintegrative factors within political life. Of course, 
Aristotle did recognize such factors. He saw immoderate differences in economic class as the 
chief obstruction to harmony in the regime, and likewise to political friendship. These competing 
factions arise from competing claims of justice between classes - rich and poor - which are 
worsened exponentially by wide gaps between economic classes. A citizenry composed of two 
disparate classes will become envious and contemptuous of each other, and these factious 
tensions will inhibit the possibility of virtues, and "create clear cleavages that can undo a polity" 
(Frank 2005, 148; Bickford 1996; Scorza 2004; Sheldon 1991).  
Aristotle's solution to the presence of divisive factions is not to eliminate the individual, 
or their differences, in service of unity. Instead, he understands political unity as made up of 
individuals, each with "difference[s] that… [mark] the unique identity of a person" (Frank 2005, 
147). In the best regimes, these individuals are brought into a unity by their economic similarity 
and the taking of others' perspectives. The citizens of the best regimes are set towards harmony 
and like-mindedness (homonoia) by those factors that make up political friendship, beneath a 
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eudaimonically-aimed constitution (Frank 2005, 144-148). This is why Aristotle emphasizes the 
necessity of a large middle class (hoi mesoi). Being of a similar class, these citizens are uniquely 
absent of disintegrative class-based factions (Frank 2005, 143-147; Pol. 1295b27-34), and are 
open to the rule of reason. Likewise, due in large part to their similarity to one another, such 
citizens would look to the common advantage, prior to what is advantageous to the individual 
(Balot 2015, 114). Because of these factors, the large middle class is more open to those political 
relationships that sum up to political friendship (the taking of others' perspectives, a mutual 
moral concern, etc.); and thus also to publicly deliberate political issues (Balot 2015). Of course, 
there are those who argue that disintegrative factors would not be so easily placated, and that -- 
no matter the regime -- would prevent the creation of an "undogmatic social unity" 
(Schwarzenbach 1996, 99; Yack 2006).  
There is a predominant focus in the scholarship concerning the applicability of these 
Aristotlelian concepts in the American regime. Many argue that the United States was founded 
upon the political ideas of modern liberalism, with the regime aimed only to protect each 
citizens' individual and unalienable rights - to life, liberty, and property, religion, etc. - from 
infringement by both the government and other individuals (Appleby 1976; Bickford 1996; 
Erkkila 2007; Schwarzenbach 1996; Smith 1999; Yack 2006). To this point, Schwarzenbach 
notes that "no theorist of the modern period explicitly argued that furthering philia [friendship] is 
a primary function of the state" (Schwarzenbach 1996, 108), as Aristotle did (NE 1155a23-26). 
Smith argues further that the United States offers only "comfortable self-preservation" (Smith 
1999, 634), instead of a classical republican inclination towards a virtuous and politically active 
citizenry (Sheldon 1991). Furthermore, liberalism's focus on the preservation of the individual 
takes the primary end of the regime away from those wants and needs held in common by each 
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citizen, and those political components and relationships that amalgamate to political friendship, 
which would go beyond mere self-preservation of individual rights and interests (Bickford 1996; 
Schwarzenbach 1996; Yack 2006; Yarbrough 2006). These impediments to political friendship 
in the American regime are, again, characterized by their liberal components. Yet, others argue 
that the ideals of classical republicanism were just as influential to the American founding 
(Shalhope 1975, 532; Sheldon 1991). Early Americans believed that the Revolution had 
instituted a regime of admirable novelty, created out of an amalgamation of the best features of 
the political philosophies of both Ancients and Moderns (Erkkila 2007; Tessitore 2003; Wood 
1998).  
To read Thomas Jefferson as a political thinker, and not focus exclusively on the actions 
taken in his personal and political life (Hardt 2007, 43), would best suit the aim of this inquiry - 
to elucidate the features in Jefferson's political thought and the ideal American regime that are 
analogous to Aristotelian political friendship. As a political philosopher, Jefferson attempted to 
construct the ideal American regime "through classical republican ideas drawn from Aristotle, 
Monstisquieu, Harrington, and the nonliberal Scottish… philosophers," while also taking many 
notes from his lasting rumination on Ancient ethical and political philosophies (Sheldon 1991, 
54; Lehmann 1947, 47-49), and those of the Moderns (Hardt 2007; Yarbrough 2006). While it is 
agreed upon that Jefferson's political thought takes influence from both Ancients and Moderns, 
there exists a debate about which was more pervasive - modern Lockean liberalism, or classical 
republicanism. Jefferson's political influences were a delicate mixture of the ethical and political 
ideas of both modern liberalism and classical republicanism (Hardt 2007; Yarbrough 2006; 
Wood 1998). Yet, it appears that Jefferson's ideal American regime is characteristically more 
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classical, in its ethical, social, and political structure, than it is liberal (Sheldon 1991; Tessitore 
2003). 
Jefferson's political thought, and his ideal American regime, was more characteristically 
classical than Lockean, Sheldon argues, for three reasons. (1) Jefferson held human nature to be 
"essentially social," which necessitated political communities. These political communities are 
not liberally protective, but instead aimed to cultivate the best part of their citizens' nature; (2) 
this deliberate cultivation comes through the citizens' direct social and political participation, 
which is made possible by the "economic, educational, and political prerequisites of [an] 
independent democratic citizenry;" and (3) that Jefferson's ethics and politics held a coequal 
emphasis on the harmony among citizens that could arise from a socially cooperative, 
democratic, self-governing, citizenry (Sheldon 1991, 54-55; Shalhope 1976). The participatory 
nature of Jefferson's ideal regime would be conducive to the virtue of those citizens, which he 
held as a necessary and strengthening feature of the regime (Sheldon 1991; Tessitore 2003; 
Wood 1998; Yarbrough 2006), for it would help subvert the corrupting forces of luxury and 
political power (Erkkila 2007; Shalhope 1976).  
Of course, Jefferson also recognized a plurality of interests. In an attempt to harmonize 
the individuals and their interests within the regime, his regime would provide the "economic, 
educational, and political prerequisites of [an] independent democratic citizenry" (Sheldon 1991, 
54). Along with these prerequisites to political friendship, Jefferson held that, "because political 
power followed property ownership, a virtuous republic must have an economically independent 
citizenry and general equality… in moderate wealth" (Sheldon 1991, 74). These egalitarian 
economics would, like Aristotle's large middle class, serve to avoid the class-based hatreds and 
resulting factions that harm the probability of civic virtues and destabilize the regime itself 
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(Barlot 2015; Frank 2005; Sheldon 1991, 72-78). An egalitarian education, too, would serve the 
same purpose. Yet it would also provide a shared public foundation, upon which these self-
governing citizens can begin to form public relationships and use their education within their 
political deliberations. Here, I believe, lies Jefferson's analogous concepts to both political 
friendship and deliberative rhetoric.  
Jefferson's ideas about what the new American republic ought to be seem quite similar to 
Aristotle's eudaimonically constituted regime. With our nature being inherently social, the best 
regimes are aimed at refining our best faculties through the cultivation of the virtues that are 
corollary to our nature. While those virtues do differ between Aristotle and Jefferson, with the 
latter being primarily influenced by Christian and Scottish moral virtues (Tessitore 2003; 
Shalhope 1991),  the general thrust of the aim of the best regimes is the same. It is this that 
motivates Lehmann to remark that, though the Ancient ethical and political ideas that Jefferson 
had drawn from "had been… homogenous with their [place and time]..." there was nevertheless 
"analogy and difference, time and again" (Lehmann 1947, 53).  
If such analogies were so frequent, it should be strange for Schwarzenbach to claim that 
philia was never directly mentioned as a "primary function of the state" (Schwarzenbach 1996, 
108). Yet, even in Jefferson's ideal American regime, there is no explicit mention of either 
personal or political friendship. In light of this apparent absence, we must then look to what 
constitutes Jefferson's political community of social cooperation and self governance. It is there 
that something analogous to Aristotelian political friendship most likely lies.  
The harmony that Jefferson's regime aims to engender is "most conducive to democratic 
self governance" (Sheldon 1991, 55), but how would it be achieved? This harmony would arise, 
as it would for Aristotle, from a large and generally equal middle class. Jefferson, like Aristotle, 
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believed that a regime composed of a large middle class would encourage its citizenry of similars 
to pursue meaningful and effective social cooperation - which, I will argue, is analogous to 
"healthy political relationships that approximate [to] civic friendship" (Balot 2015, 113). Further, 
within and among these political relationships, Jefferson also saw public deliberation as an 
invaluable tool for the sustainability of his republican government. After all, it is prudent 
deliberation over the best course of action for the community -- towards the achievement of 
common wants and aims -- is the essence of a participatory citizenry (Erkkila 2007; Shalhope 
1976; Sheldon 1991, 69-70; Schwarzenbach 1996; Yack 2006).  
Though there seem to be many prominent parallels between Aristotle's and Jefferson's 
political thought - which then lead one to draw another between their conceptions of what 
approximates to political friendship - it is still too early to lay these connections with certainty. 
We must be careful: both he and Aristotle are enigmatic thinkers, and the topics they examine 
are greatly complex in themselves. Nevertheless, despite the scholarship not drawing direct 
parallels, provides strong inclinations towards the likelihood that a Jeffersonian concept 
analogous to politikē philia can be found and defended.  
 
Research Methods 
To best attempt to draw these parallels between Aristotle and Thomas Jefferson's 
analogous concepts of political friendship (politikē philia), the virtue of prudence (phronēsis), 
and its public exercise in deliberative rhetoric (symbouleutikon rhētorikē), they must be 
deconstructed and their parts laid out in a logical order. This will allow for the premises of each 




Throughout the inquiry, I will be using only three of Aristotle's texts - the Politics, the 
Nicomachean Ethics, and the Rhetoric. I will include in an appendix each specific book/chapter 
of those texts used. As for Jefferson, I will likewise include in a second appendix all of the public 
papers, correspondences, and publications used as primary source material to understand 
Jefferson's best regime, its components, and its philosophical foundations. 
I will move forward by answering various smaller theses concerning the institutional 
organization of both Aristotle and Jefferson's best regimes, and the philosophical principles that 
inform the aims of those regimes. Concerning the latter I will show that, on a foundational level 
for both Aristotle and Jefferson, man is by nature a political animal. There have been plentiful 
discussions in the literature concerning each thinker's conception of human nature, 
independently. There has also been some attention to Jefferson's understanding of human nature, 
and its similarities and differences to the classical understanding (Sheldon 1991; Yarbrough 
2006). Yet, there has been no comparison between Jefferson and Aristotle's understanding of 
human nature for the express purpose of this thesis. In doing so, I will demonstrate that 
Jefferson's understanding of human nature is more amicable than Aristotle's. This notable 
difference, coming from the influences of Christian ethics and Scottish moral-sense philosophers 
(Sheldon 1991; Yarbrough 2006), has important implications for finding something akin to 
political friendship in Jefferson's ideal regime. 
Subsequent to this, I will attempt to demonstrate the fundamental point that for both 
Aristotle and Jefferson the best human life is one that aims at Happiness. And that each thinker's 
understanding of Happiness is both similar and different in important ways. For Jefferson, 
Happiness is not defined as explicitly as it is for Aristotle in Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
It is the differences within the two conceptions of Happiness - both achieved through the 
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cultivation of virtues that arise through our nature (which, again, is both similar and different) - 
that will help to demonstrate the unique combination of both classical and modern liberal 
influences in Jefferson's political thought. Aristotle and Jefferson likewise agree that political 
society arises naturally out of our political nature as human beings. And, like the best form of 
human life, the best regime is one that is aimed towards the Happiness of its citizens. It is 
important to note that, in order to grasp this shared aim of the best regimes, both thinkers held 
that virtue (as necessary for Happiness) would be largely cultivated through participation in 
political society. By highlighting this similarity between the two, I will show that political 
participation within the best regimes is fundamentally important to political friendship and the 
potential of an analogous feature. 
Though there are similarities between Jefferson and Aristotle concerning the securing of 
Happiness by the cultivation of virtue through participation in political society, there is a notable 
difference in Jefferson's thought that allows the individual to pursue their own interests and aims 
-- within the bounds of their social and political obligations. This freedom of individuals, 
existing within the boundaries of obligations to the regime, is yet another example of Jefferson's 
alterations of the classical ideas that he so strongly took influence from. Another important 
alteration between Aristotle and Jefferson is the content of those virtues most conducive to the 
best human life, with Jefferson being strongly influenced by Christian ethics and Scottish moral 
sense philosophers. Importantly, I will attempt to demonstrate that the virtues which Jefferson 
held as paramount do not make impossible the existence of political friendship in his best 
regime. Rather, they strengthen it.  
Once these components and their conductivity to political friendship are shown, we can 
comfortably move to examine Jefferson's best American regime. In this, I will look to show that 
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it is likewise made of unique components that are similar to, but also different from, the Greek 
polis, such as: an egalitarian, self-governing citizenry who are economically independent in a 
large middle class, educated for competent political and social participation, and cultivate their 
virtue (corresponding to their amicable nature) through such participation. Once this is laid out, I 
can argue that within and from these components, there is a feature akin to Aristotelian political 
friendship. Despite these classical similarities in Jefferson's best regime, the citizens of it are 
likewise suited to be the best protectors of their own individual and inalienable rights, thereby 
achieving a liberal aim of the regime through more classical means. It is this point of difference, 
among others mentioned before, that will also help to demonstrate the innate tension within 
Jefferson's political thought between classical republican and modern liberal aims.  
Furthermore, those components conducive to political friendship in Aristotle's best 
regimes are also conducive to harmony within the citizenry. For Jefferson, too (with the notable 
modern addition of the liberal protection of natural rights, within a citizenry of individuals who 
are naturally amicable and benevolent), the best regime likewise seeks to achieve stability 
through the classical means of the cultivation of virtue, through political participation, within a 
citizenry of similars. This would place within the citizenry the attitudes, capabilities, and ethical 
and intellectual foundations that are conducive to harmony. With this, I will attempt to show that, 
for Jefferson and Aristotle both, political friendship can be found nearby to those things that are 
conducive to harmony (homonoia) - or, like-mindedness - in the best regimes.  
 
Section I - Foundations for Political Friendship 
All of Aristotle's philosophy works within a teleological frame, and thus it is from this 
frame that all of his political ideas are guided. For Aristotle, each thing that exists by nature has 
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an end towards which it moves. In a state of always becoming, those things with tele are always 
moving in and from the present towards their final purpose and/or best form. Since "the city 
belongs among the things that exist by nature, and… man is by nature a political animal" (Pol. 
1253a1-2), each of these thus moves toward some good (Pol. 1252a1-3; NE 1094a1-3).  
It is our nature and ends as individuals that informs the nature of the political community 
itself. The political community is made up of individuals, and unity within it arises from those 
who "differ in kind." And, in a notable hightening of the individual's importance, Aristotle 
argues that "what is less a unity is more choiceworthy" [emphasis mine] (Pol. 1261a30, b13-15). 
If the End of human beings informs that of the community, then what is that End? Aristotle held 
it to be happiness or flourishing (eudaimonia), which he saw accessible only by "activity of the 
soul in accord with virtue, and if there are several… then in accord with the best and most 
complete one… [over] a complete life" (NE 1098a16-19). The virtues - or, character traits - with 
which our souls must act in accordance, are twofold in their type. There are intellectual virtues 
and moral virtues, the former gotten through teaching and guidance, and the latter through 
habituation. 
What aspects of the best regimes, then, help to cultivate or engender politikē philia 
between citizens? When speaking of regimes, Aristotle means both the governing body 
(politeuma), and the offices or laws of authority (kyrios). "What has authority in the city (polis) 
is everywhere the governing body, and the governing body is the regime" (Pol. 1278b10-13). 
Further, the constitution (politeia3) of any regime is not just its laws, but also its customs, values, 
and practices (Frank 2005). The most authoritative regime - made of the governing body and the 
                                               
3 Aristotle uses Politeia interchangeably, and sometimes unclearly, when discussing the following: 
constitutions, the rule of the many in the common interest, and the best practicable regime (all of which 
are called Politeia, and sometimes translated as Polity) throughout the Politics. For clarity, see Lord's 
2013 translation.  
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laws of authority - is that which aims for its citizens living well and finely, while ruling "with a 
view to the common advantage" (Pol. 1278b16-26; 1279a29-30). Importantly, Aristotle also 
believes that the best regime ought to be made up of "equal and similar persons to the extent 
possible," which is most practically accomplished through a large middle class (Pol. 1295b26-
27). Such regimes are eudaimonically constituted, and it is within them that political friendship - 
along with virtue, prudence, right rule, stability, and justice - are easiest to grasp.  
Aristotle opens Politics IV.11 by making it clear that he wants to examine the features of 
the best regime "which it is possible for most to share in, and… of which most cities can 
partake" (Pol. 1295a29-30). Thus, despite Aristotle spending significant portions of Politics 
discussing both the Ideal Regime (euchomenoi or True Aristocracy)4 and the Polity (politeia or 
Mixed Regime)5, I will analyze only their shared and relevant features, and not examine the 
specific constructions of each. In this way I follow Aristotle, for he states that those two regimes 
are so ambiguously similar in their aim(s) and features that "we may speak of both as one" (Pol. 
1295a29).  
When speaking of the Polity in Politics IV.11, and in accord with the Doctrine of the 
Mean, Aristotle states a larger middle class is most suitable to the best regimes (Pol. 1295b3-5). 
This middle class (hoi mesoi), being neither too rich nor too poor, is most suitable to possess the 
characteristics that accumulate to political friendship. Why is the hoi mesoi preferred over the 
other classes? The very rich are arrogant: their luxuries make them ignorant of being ruled, and 
their lives of leisure make them unwilling to rule (Pol. 1295b15-16). And the very poor are 
envious: they are accustomed only to being ruled, and thus are contemptuous of their rulers while 
also desiring both power and property (Pol. 1295b30-34). Thus both classes - of extreme excess 
                                               
4 Politics VII, VIII 
5 Politics II.12, IV.11 
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and of extreme deficiency - are unwilling to obey reason: they cannot understand right rule and 
therefore cannot rule and be ruled in turn. This is caused by the exaggerated distance between 
their classes, and the circumstances of the classes themselves, which make it nearly impossible 
for each to prudently expand their perception and consider the good of the other. It is in this way 
that a regime made up of the excessively rich and poor is the farthest removed "from affection 
and a political community" (Pol. 1295b24), for both are imprudent and incapable of right rule.  
The middle class, being made up of similar persons, is without the deficiencies inherent 
in the extreme. Without ignorance or envy, citizens of the middle class are better for the 
authoritative regimes in every sense. Citizens of the middle class are similar in property and thus 
generally equal. This removes the disintegrative factors of extremes and opens the middling class 
to both ruling and being ruled. Inherent in this openness, and their place in the most authoritative 
regimes, is the capacity for prudence and virtue (Pol. 1295b26-34). An openness to right rule and 
a closeness to virtue are not the only reasons for the superiority of the hoi mesoi. A large middle 
class is also least inclined to faction (stasis), for "factional conflict is everywhere the result of 
inequality" (Pol. 1301b26-27). The envy of the poor towards the rich and the contempt of the 
rich towards the poor leads inevitably to master-slave relations of ruling, which is the worst of all 
relationships (Pol. 1278b31-37, 1295b18-20). It is the desire to rule in the interest of the ruler, 
and not the common advantage, that is most detrimental to the longevity and stability of any 
regime, not to mention the good that ought to be aimed at through right rule (Pol. 1278b30-
1279a41). This is why Aristotle insists that "it is the greatest good fortune for those who are 
engaged in politics to have a middling and sufficient property" (Pol. 1295b40-1296a1): since the 
best regime "must necessarily be governed in the best fashion," and the hoi mesoi  within it 
"most particularly preserve themselves" (Pol. 1295b27-34), they are most capable of and open to 
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the best way of life "which it is possible for most to share in" (Pol. 1295a29-30), which 
necessarily includes political friendship.  
 
Sec. II - The Nature and Necessity of Prudence 
Aristotle notes in Politics III.9 that "whoever [cares for] good governance… gives careful 
attention to political virtue and vice" (1280b6-7). With the nature of the most authoritative 
human good, its corresponding regime, and the proper citizen and class within that regime now 
identified, what comes next is the identification and explanation of the political virtue(s) that is 
most conducive to political friendship.  
Throughout Politics, Aristotle is insistent about the necessity of prudence (phronēsis) 
within the best regimes,6 and he offers a detailed account of the nature of that virtue in his 
Nicomachean Ethics. To possess prudence is "simply [to be] skilled in aiming, in accord with 
[reason], at what is best for a human being in things attainable through action," and how this 
action can best accord with virtue over a complete life (NE 1141b10-17). Thus, the prudent 
person can best discern their own boundaries of excess and deficiency - they can best determine 
the mean in which virtue lies, subsequent to their understanding of the good, or eudaimonia (NE 
1138b20-25, 1139b30-31, 1142b29-33). Moreover, prudence is an intellectual virtue that is 
inseparable from moral virtue, for the deliberation characteristic of prudence is that which helps 
us aim at and habituate virtue in line with the good (NE 1144a7-9, 1145a5-7, 1178a16-19).  
Prudence, being "the political art" (NE 1141a22), has an incredibly important public role 
in the best regimes. The practically wise, being excellent deliberators, consider both "what is 
good and advantageous for [the self]," just as the moderate do, but also "the sorts of things 
                                               
6 For some examples, see the mid-to-late chapters of Pol. III, as well as IV.11 and VII.1-3. 
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conducive to living well in general" (NE 1140a25-32). The prudent person's consideration of 
other things conducive to living well, along with their understanding of their own boundaries, 
thereby widens their own perspective to accommodate their interests and those of others within 
the polis.7 This, when taken alongside the general equality of the large middle class, promotes 
enlarged and accommodating outlooks between citizens. This prudent partiality between them is 
conducive to egalitarian attitudes of mutual respect,8 and thus to ruling for the common 
advantage.  
To know one's own boundaries and to consider those of others, and to deliberate with 
these particulars towards the higher good (NE 1142b29-35), is the mark of the prudent. This is 
important in the coming discussion of the public exercise of prudence through deliberative 
rhetoric. Further, the essence of prudence is the same as that of right rule. The best regimes "look 
to the common advantage," in that their citizens rule and are ruled in turn by "having someone 
look to their good, just as when ruling previously they looked to his" (Pol. 1279a5-22). This is 
made possible through the prudent expansion of individual perceptions, which promotes 
egalitarian attitudes of mutual respect. These perceptions, attitudes, and grasp of right rule 
through prudence lends to Aristotle's claim in Politics that the middling class of the best regimes 
"must necessarily be governed in the best fashion," for their mutual respect and ruling in turn - 
along with their unique avoidance of faction - allow them to "most particularly preserve 
themselves" (Pol. 1295b27-34). It is through all of these factors that they are most capable of the 
best way of life, "which it is possible for most to share in" (Pol. 1295a29-30). Political friendship 
-- being a combination of attitudes of mutual self-respect and "an egalitarian attitude based on 
the knowledge of how to rule and be ruled," along with the prudent taking of enlarged outlooks 
                                               
7 See Frank (2005), 92-102, for a nuanced and detailed account of prudence. 
8 See Balot's definition of political friendship above. 
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that avoid "class-based hatreds and [encourage] a willingness to take the perspective of others" 
(Balot 2015, 112) -- is clearly an amalgamation of all of the aforementioned features and 
relationships of the middling class in the best regimes. It would also follow that, without a 
citizenry who possesses and exercises prudence, the formation of attitudes and relationships 
among them that amalgamate into political friendship would be impossible. 
 When it does emerge, though, political friendship makes possible the praiseworthy 
features of the best regime, while also coming as a result of them. The stability of relations 
between citizens who prudently rule in turn, and their inclination to virtue, makes accurate 
Aristotle's claim that "like-mindedness [homonoia], therefore, appears to be political friendship" 
(NE 1167b2-3, NE 1155a23-27). The stability of relationships between citizens, their inclination 
to both public and private virtue, and their knowledge and capability of right rule is generally 
what produces harmony or concord (homonoia) between citizens. And this is why Aristotle 
argues that serious citizens and legislators are "more serious about [political friendship] than 
justice" (NE 1155a24). 
 
Sec. III - The Prudent Use of Deliberation 
Frequently in his discussion of the citizenry of the best regimes and their prudent 
capabilities, Aristotle mentions their self-same capacity for deliberation. Deliberative rhetoric 
(symboleutikon rhētorikē) is a political tool to be used among citizens of the best regimes (Pol. 
1281b31-35) in their determination of what future action(s) they ought to take (Rhet. 1358b21-
27). These actions are correctly determined within a shared conception of the highest good (Rhet. 
1360b4-29; NE 1142b30-35), as found and maintained through prudent habituation. 
Deliberation, then, is only performed properly when it is done so prudently (Rhet. 1366b19-21), 
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by one who understands the well-aimed features and practices of their regime (Rhet. 1366b19-
21). Thus, those with prudence can more easily deliberate with properly, with well-aimed 
efficacy (NE 1140a32, 1142b1-35).  
Deliberation - and deliberative rhetoric as the public exercise of prudence - is, in its 
closeness to prudence, likewise related to the egalitarian and accommodating attitudes that arise 
in political friendships. Aristotle, after his explanation of the uses of deliberative rhetoric, insists 
that what matters more than the dialectic itself is the character of those deliberating. Specifically, 
their "practical intelligence [prudence], virtue, and goodwill" (Rhet. 1378a6-9). By goodwill, it 
would appear that Aristotle is pointing towards the accommodating attitudes, which arise out of a 
prudent and virtuous citizenry who are egalitarian in their capability and knowledge of right rule. 
This goodwill that arises out of prudence and virtue is conducive to public deliberation and thus 
also right rule and its necessary features. Prudence and the goodwill inherent as a result of it 
would be conducive to right rule, for good citizens of the best regime are praised for their 
"knowledge of rule over free persons from both points of view" (Pol. 1277b15-16). Goodwill 
thus also appears to be an amalgam of those attitudes and relationships that equate to political 
friendship. This is supported, among other things, by Aristotle's focus on the concept of equity 
and compassion among citizens in both legislation and punitive law which arises among prudent 
deliberators (Rhet. 1374a28-b23). These citizens would be able to expand their perceptions 
beyond themselves, making allowances for "human failings" (Rhet. 1364b11) and attempting 
prudently "to grasp the whole picture" (Rhet. 1374b14) in situations concerning the potential 
punishment of their fellow citizens.  
The goodwill and egalitarian attitudes related to prudence would likewise further 
dissuade inclinations towards faction (stasis) among the middling class of right-ruling citizens in 
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the best regimes. Good citizens, again, understand right rule as coming from widened 
perspectives and being for the common advantage (Pol. 1277b15-16). This, along with the 
abating of factious inclinations with the large middle class, and citizens' goodwill as coming 
from prudence and proper deliberation, and their shared conception of the best End, are all 
combined to be conducive to concord (homonoia) in the regime. Since concord among citizens is 
most desirable to the best regimes, and "like-mindedness [homonoia], therefore, appears to be 
political friendship" (NE 1167b2-3, NE 1155a23-27), it would appear that political friendship  
ought to be a primary aim of the best regimes.  
All of the aforementioned features of political friendship are important and relevant for 
the comparison to Jefferson -- especially the understanding of political friendship as both 
conducive to, and made possible by, a prudent citizenry and their capacity for deliberation 
among a large, well-aimed middle class. To have these laid out before us as such provides steady 
and clear moorings from which we can work to compare the relevant features of Thomas 
Jefferson's political philosophy. 
 
Sec. IV: Jefferson's Philosophical Foundations 
Like Aristotle, Jefferson held that we are naturally social beings. Our social nature, 
importantly, is informed by an innate moral sense. This moral sense, composed of a mutual care 
and sense of duty towards others (to Francis W. Gilmer, June 7, 1816), is a general but clear 
departing from the modern liberal understanding of human nature as asocial and adversarial, 
entering political society artificially by the necessity of a social contract for a mutual assurance 
of protection.9 Likewise, our social nature - and the corresponding moral sense - is inherently 
                                               
9 See Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan, 1651; John Locke's Second Treatise of Government, 1689. This 
departure is continued in Jefferson's belief that society and politics are also of natural roots. 
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amicable (Sheldon 1991; Yarbrough 2006). What features compose this social, amicable nature 
and moral sense? This can be understood by viewing the moral sense when it is best cultivated 
and/or refined. Writing of the moral doctrine of Jesus Christ, Jefferson praises that it "went far 
beyond… in inculcating universal philanthropy… to all mankind… under the bonds of love, 
charity, peace, [and] common wants and common aids" (to Benjamin Rush, April 21, 1803). This 
extended mutual benevolence is also composed of "the feelings of sympathy, of benevolence, of 
gratitude, of justice, of love, [and] of friendship" (to Maria Cosway, October 12, 1786).  
Jefferson, in his praise of Christ's moral doctrine,10 saw it to be the most perfect refinement of 
our naturally social and amicable moral sense, and of our innate benevolent duties to others. 
Importantly, the morality of Christ does not inform our nature. It is our nature that was refined 
and spoken to by Christ with "the sublimest of eloquence" (to Benjamin Rush, April 21, 1803).  
Our social nature, as it informs our morality, likewise informs the natural advent of 
society. Jefferson writes that society comes out of a "natural [want] with which man has been 
created…" and, that human beings were "endowed with faculties and qualities to effect its 
satisfaction by concurrence of others having that same want…" (to P.S. DuPont de Nemours, 
April 24, 1816). This desire is not material, but an innate moral desire for community that arises 
from our social nature. Such is why Jefferson held that the liberal understanding of human nature 
as antisocial, egoistic, and adversarial was a "humiliation…" for "Man was created for social 
intercourse," and thus also "man must have been created with a sense of justice" (to Francis W. 
Gilmer, June 7, 1816; to Thomas Law, June 13, 1814).  
                                               
10 When discussing Christian morality, Jefferson is explicitly critical of the Church. See his letters to 
Benjamin Rush, April 21, 1803, to Peter Carr, September 7, 1814, and to John Adams May 5, 1817. See 
also Frost and Sikkenga's History of American Political Thought, Chapter VII by A. Tessitore; and 
Sheldon 1991.  
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Since we are naturally social and notably amicable, and since political society emerges 
necessarily from these components, the question arises: what did Jefferson hold the best human 
life to be, and how strongly ought the regime compel its citizens towards such a life? These 
questions can be properly understood only when considering them in tandem with what he saw 
as the ideal political society. Jefferson believed that the best human life is one in which we 
cultivate virtue (which corresponds to our amicable nature, as seen in the moral sense) through 
continual social cooperation and political participation. This is "essential to the happiness of 
man," for "individual happiness [is] inseparable from the practice of virtue" (to Benjamin Rush, 
April 21, 1803; to J. Correa de. Serra, April 19, 1814). Our moral sense and its corresponding 
virtues, then, must be cultivated correctly if happiness is to be well-sought. And, while we are 
not naturally selfish and egoistic, we are susceptible to corruption by these vices if our moral 
sense is not well-cultivated. This, Jefferson believed, would lead inherently to the avoidance 
and/or ignorance of our innate duties to others and to political society (to Edmund Pendleton, 
August 26, 1776).  
Our potential to act in an adversarial and antisocial way - contrary to our nature - is  "the 
sole antagonist of virtue." Vice, then, would be those traits or actions related to "self-gratification 
in violation of our moral duties to others" (to Thomas Law, June 13, 1814). From this, two things 
become clear. The first is that virtue or moral excellence, for Jefferson, is outwardly focused. He 
praised ancient philosophers11 for their attention to our private morals and well-being, but was 
critical of them for the very same reason. In their attention to our private selves, they did not 
include the inclinations of our moral sense towards "peace, charity, and love to our fellow men," 
as one of our "primary obligations," whereas the ethics of Christ does (to Benjamin Rush, April 
                                               
11 "...particularly Pythagoras, Socrates, Epicurus, Cicero, Epictetus, Seneca, Antonius" (to Benjamin 
Rush, April 21, 1803). 
 
26 
21, 1803). The second is that, from this preceding primary ethical obligation, Jefferson held the 
pursuit of virtue - or, the refining and exercise of our moral sense - as one of the salient aims of 
human life.  
What, then, are the salient aims of Jefferson's best American regime? Jefferson writes 
"that with nations, as with individuals, our interests soundly calculated, will ever be found 
inseparable from our moral duties” (Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1805). To tie the 
interests of the regime to each citizen's outward duties would tie the interests of the regime to the 
cultivation of virtue (in accordance with their moral sense) - or, it would tie the interest of the 
regime to each citizen's pursuit of happiness (to J. Correa de. Serra, April 19, 1814). 
The well-aimed regime would then have great interest in cultivating the hearts and minds 
of its citizens, for they could judge "to a competent degree" (to Peter Carr, Sept. 7, 1814) those 
things, morally and intellectually, that "will secure or endanger [their] freedom" (to John Tyler, 
May 26, 1810). This would also allow the citizenry to competently participate in political 
society, which therein exercises their social nature and moral sense.12 It is this idea that strongly 
guides Jefferson's theoretical - and ideal - political structure. He writes that "the foundation of 
public happiness [is found] in wholesome laws, the execution of which alone remains for 
[individuals]…" (Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1805). We will see shortly that the best 
American regime, for Jefferson, is one that equips its citizens for the cultivation of their 
outwardly focused virtue and the individual pursuit of happiness, while also securing their own 
individual rights and liberties - as achieved through their dutiful cooperation in, and self-
governance of, political society. 
                                               
12 See his letters to Maj. John Cartwright, June 5, 1824; to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816; to John 
Taylor, May 28, 1816. 
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Jefferson saw significant importance in the regime meeting the "common wants and 
common aims" of its citizens (to Benjamin Rush, April 21, 1803). Yet he also emphasized 
another aim: the protection and assurance of their natural and unchanging individual rights. 
Primary of these rights are those of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" (The Declaration 
of Independence, 1776). Others are likewise emphasized, such as: “freedom… of religion13… 
[and] of property” (to Maj. John Cartwright, June 5, 1824). For Jefferson, the protection and 
assurance of such rights is a primary want and aim held in common. Yet, the pursuit of happiness 
for individuals of a virtuous citizenry is another such aim. Here, one can begin to see clearly the 
mixture of classical and liberal themes in Jefferson's political thought: the primary aim(s) of his 
best regime being to secure the common wants and aims of its citizens (such as their rights and 
liberties, and their happiness through virtue) as achieved by their direct political participation. 
How does this shared emphasis - representative of the tension between modern liberalism 
and classical republicanism in Jefferson's political thought (Sheldon 1991; Yarborough 2006) - 
not contradict itself? In the his ideal American regime, Jefferson attempted to harmonize the 
tensions between those two aims - the protection of the rights of each individual, and the 
inclination of those same individuals to outwardly exercise their moral sense in political society. 
To understand this, we must examine the institutional and ethical components of Jefferson's 
regime. Only subsequent to this may we also examine the analogous components that give way 
to Aristotelian political friendship. How, then, would a regime be designed if its goals were to 
both guard the individual from the violation of their natural rights, while also cultivating their 
social, amicable moral sense? Jefferson believed strongly that representative republicanism, 
more than any other form of government, was best suited to achieve both of those aims.  
                                               




Sec. V - Ethical Institutions upon the Foundation 
 Jefferson wrote that "a government is republican in proportion as every member 
composing it has his equal voice in the direction of its concerns." In cases of inability, these 
otherwise competent citizens would use their equal voices to govern instead "by representatives 
chosen by [themselves]" (to Samuel Kercheval, July 12 1816).14 These principles are best 
actualized, on a foundational level, by what Jefferson called ward republics. These "bore a 
striking resemblance to the ideal Greek polis," in that they "also strove to realize man's social 
nature through direct citizen participation in local community life" (Sheldon 1991, 67). These 
wards, while similar to the polis, were an original and unique institutional form of government 
suited to fulfill the aims of Jefferson's best regime. He even desired to revise the Virginia 
constitution15, imploring that legislators ought to "divide the counties into wards of such size as 
that every citizen can attend, when called on, and act in person." Functioning on the premise that 
"all power is inherent in the people," each citizen would then be "an active member of the 
government" (to Samuel Kercheval, July 12 1816). As such, they would be self-governing "in all 
cases which they think themselves competent." Or, again, in cases of elections and/or 
incompetence, "they may act by representatives, freely and equally chosen" (to Maj. John 
Cartwright, June 5, 1824). Each individual ward, being maintained through the self-governance 
of its citizens, would have important obligations of common interest that its citizens would 
attend to, such as: education, policing, care for the poor, local infrastructure, and the elections of 
jurors and other municipal positions.16 These obligations would make each ward “a small 
                                               
14 See also the letter to John Taylor, May 28, 1816. 
15 See Jefferson's Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge (1778). 
16 See Jefferson's letters to Maj. John Cartwright, June 5 1824, and Samiel Kercheval, July 12, 1816.  
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republic within itself," with each citizen again "transacting in person a great portion of its rights 
and duties… entirely within his competence” (to Maj. John Cartwright, June 5, 1824). Ward 
republics, then, are designed to promote political participation and social cooperation through 
their necessary self-governance.  
These "little republics" (to John Tyler, May 26, 1810), so aimed, were thought by 
Jefferson to be the best way of securing an ethical citizenry through the exercise of their social 
nature. Yet, an individual's morality is not nurtured only by their participation in self-
governance. Their hearts, minds, and actions in political society must be guided by a proper 
education, available to all citizens. Jefferson wrote that without an educated citizenry, "no 
republic can maintain itself…" for only with an education can citizens properly govern 
themselves (to John Tyler, May 26, 1810). An educated citizenry is, for Jefferson, so necessary 
for the well-being of the regime that it would be provided and maintained "wholly at the public 
expense…" Each citizen, then, would receive an education "proportioned to the condition and 
pursuits of his life." Upon this foundation, these citizens would be suited "to a competent 
degree," both morally and intellectually, for their public duties and private pursuits (to Peter 
Carr, September 7, 1814). Such is why Jefferson believed so strongly in "a crusade against 
ignorance…" (George Wythe, August 13, 1786), because if each citizen was educated to a 
competent degree, they would be able to both defend themselves against intrusions of their 
natural rights and participate competently in republican self-governance. This would help to 
ensure, on an individual and institutional level, the accomplishment of both salient aims of 
Jefferson's republican government (protecting individual rights, while also cultivating our innate 
social and amicable moral sense).  
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How would education, within the framework of the ward republics, achieve such a feat? 
Jefferson believed it would be accomplished through the refinement of the head and heart of 
each citizen. The head possessing reason and prudence, the heart possessing the "feelings of 
sympathy, of benevolence… of justice, of love, of friendship" (to Maria Cosway, October 12, 
1786). A proper education would not only work to create citizens capable of deliberation and 
self-governance, but also those most capable of virtue in accord with the moral sense. Of those 
whose moral sense is lacking, Jefferson writes that the regime then should "endeavor to supply 
the defect by education, [and] by appeals to reason…" which, through "demonstrations by sound 
calculation," would show that "society is necessary to [their] happiness and even existence" (to 
Thomas Law, June 13, 1814). In other words, those whose moral sense is deficient would be led 
by education to recognize their nature, the necessity of the exercise their moral sense in political 
society, and also be made competent for proper participation in political society.  
And what of those with extraordinary moral and intellectual predispositions? Jefferson 
writes that "natural aristocracy among men," is grounded in superior demonstrations of virtues 
and intellectual talents (to John Adams, October 28, 1813). This natural aristocracy is 
fundamentally different from the "artificial aristocracy founded on wealth and birth, without 
either virtue or talents…" and it is considered by Jefferson to be "the most precious gift of nature 
for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society." This natural aristocracy (aristoi) 
would emerge most purely from the ward republics, for the equality of opportunity from a 
publicly funded education for each citizen would allow for "worth and genius [to be] sought 
from every condition of life" (to John Adams, October 28, 1813; Bill for the More General 
Diffusion of Knowledge, 1778). These citizens would move into the highest levels of education, 
being further educated and refined, morally and intellectually, to eventually take on a life as 
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legislators, scientists, religious leaders, and other leaders in political society. The natural 
aristocracy would have this education "maintained wholly at the public expense, on the same 
principles with that of the ward schools" (to Peter Carr, September 7, 1814). Jefferson's system 
of education was thus designed to raise "the mass of the people to the high ground of moral 
respectability necessary to their own safety, and to orderly government…" Along with crafting a 
citizenry capable of benevolent self-government within the framework of the ward republics, this 
system of education "would have completed the great object of qualifying [the citizens] to select 
the veritable aristoi, for the trusts of the government [as representatives and officials]” (to John 
Adams, October 28, 1813).  
An educated citizenry -- whose moral sense and natural social duties are exercised along 
with their intellectual competence for self-governance -- is the best possible security against 
injustice and tyranny, for "every man [can] judge for himself what will secure or endanger his 
freedom" (to John Tyler, May 26, 1810). This ability of each individual to properly judge what is 
best for themselves is paralleled by the Aristotelian idea of prudence, or, the "political art" (NE 
1141a22). And, arising from the prudent person's capability for deliberation of what is good for 
themselves, is an outward expansion of these considerations to others. Since the highest aim of 
human life (Happiness) guides the conduct of both the individual and the regime, the prudent 
person must consider the good of their fellow citizens and the common advantage for all.17 For 
Jefferson, this expansion of our considerations -- or, the widening of our perspectives -- is a more 
immediate and prominent feature of the citizenry. Jefferson's prudent citizen would appear to be 
superior in the context of political deliberation. Each citizen's moral sense, being exercised 
through political participation and social cooperation (which itself requires public deliberation - 
                                               
17 See Frank (2005) for a more elaborated presentation of this argument. 
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an exercise of prudence), would prominently incline those citizens to act in accordance with 
benevolence, sympathy, charity, and friendship. This would not only make relationships between 
individuals more amicable, which may help to preserve their individual rights from infringement 
on a smaller scale, but would also be conducive to the deliberation of "common wants and 
common aids" (to Benjamin Rush, April 21, 1803). 
The citizens of Jefferson's republican system of government would have equal 
opportunity in almost all aspects of their lives. And, importantly, an inequality of outcome was 
likewise permissible, so long as it did not detract from the independent, competently educated, 
politically participating citizenry (see Sheldon 1991, 72-73). This is most clearly demonstrated in 
the ward's system of education, which provided a free education to each that was "proportioned 
to the condition and pursuits of his life" (to Peter Carr, September 7, 1814) though these 
proportionate conditions may offer someone of extraordinary intelligence more education than, 
say, one who wishes to become a farmer or a cobbler. This equality of opportunity and potential 
inequality of outcome likewise presents itself in the economic features of Jefferson's republican 
regime. As Jefferson writes in his Second Inaugural Address, it was among his goals that while 
the "equality of rights be maintained," the right and state of property would also be maintained, 
whether "equal or unequal, which results to every man from his own industry." Jefferson's 
support of individual industry and property rights is consistent with his views of what an 
educated, self-governing, independent citizenry must possess to remain as such, for each citizen 
must be economically independent to properly participate in political society. Without 
independence, those citizens cannot properly exercise their moral sense through participation, for 
"dependence begets subservience and venality, [and] suffocates the germ of virtue…" (Notes on 
the State of Virginia, Query XIX).  
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While he was supportive of private industry for the independence it would grant citizens, 
Jefferson was nevertheless supportive of a moderate economy -- not one of complete equality, 
for he was "conscious that an equal division of property is impractable" (to James Madison, 
October 28, 1785). Economic moderation would ensure political independence, while also 
keeping at bay the economic immoderation that would see people of great wealth isolated -- out 
of leisure -- from participation in political society. Akin to representatives with life 
appointments, the immoderately wealthy "might perhaps be induced by their independence to 
forget…" their moral and political obligations to the regime (to Edmund Pendleton, August 26, 
1776). Likewise, Jefferson had witnessed in Europe the result of gross economic inequality: it 
was conducive to "so much misery to the bulk of mankind…" (to James Madison, October 28, 
1785), for the dependence it produces, again, "begets subservience and venality, [and] suffocates 
the germ of virtue…" (Notes, Query XIX). Jefferson held that, due to their economic moderation, 
competent education, and simplistic lifestyle, the large middle class of agrarian workers are those 
who are best suited for participation in political society and self-governance. This is why he says 
in praise that "those who labor the earth… [are the] peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine 
virtue…" and, further, that the "corruption of morals in the mass of cultivators is a phenomenon 
of which no age… has furnished an example" (Notes, Query XIX).  
Jefferson's large agrarian middle class has strong similarities to Aristotle's large middle-
class (hoi mesoi). In this way, we can see that Aristotle would agree with Jefferson that a regime 
composed of large inequalities would be wrought with factional conflict (Pol. 1301b26-27), 
which would "[suffocate] the germ of virtue…" (Notes, Query XIX) and thus be cause for "so 
much misery to the bulk of mankind…" (to James Madison, October 28, 1785). The openness 
and capability of Aristotle's large middle class to grasp prudence, right rule, and virtue (Pol. 
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1295a29-30, b26-34) is likewise paralleled by Jefferson's understanding that those with "a 
middling and sufficient property" (Pol. 1295b40) would be the "peculiar deposit for substantial 
and genuine virtue…" (Notes, Query XIX). 
In sum: the best life to be aimed at within Jefferson's regime is one that exercises and 
refines our social, amicable natures. In other words: one that cultivates our benevolent virtues 
through political participation and social cooperation. The best form of government to 
accomplish such aims, for Jefferson, was a unique republican framework of small, self-
governing wards. Composed mainly of an economically moderate, middle class citizenry, these 
wards were designed to make social cooperation through self-governance necessary for its proper 
functioning. To ensure a competent citizenry in both their morals and their intellect, the wards 
would provide education at the public expense. Due to an educated, economically independent 
citizenry, characterized by their moral benevolence and a capacity for the prudent deliberation 
inherent in self-governance, these wards are most conducive to happiness: itself being tied, 
again, invariably to the practice of virtue. Ward republics were thus praised by Jefferson as being 
constructed and aimed so well that "the wit of man [could not] devise a more solid basis for a 
free, durable, and well administered republic" (to Maj. John Cartwright, June 5, 1824). 
 
Sec. VI - Political Friendship within an Egalitarian Citizenry? 
 It is at this point of the inquiry that we may finally examine the analogous components 
between the ideal regimes of Aristotle and Thomas Jefferson, which will give way to an 
analogous concept of political friendship in the latter. In Jefferson's ideal political society, 
economic independence within a generally equal, moderate, large middle class was a necessary 
requisite for a regime aimed at the cultivation and maintenance of a virtuous, competent, self-
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governing citizenry. Without economic independence for the largest number of citizens possible 
-- and more so without the gross inequality that Jefferson held to be a large source of political 
and moral corruption -- proper self-governance would be impossible. We can see also within 
Jefferson's disdain for gross inequality the Aristotelian argument against class-based hatreds, 
which are corrosive to the concept of right rule that is necessary for political friendship. Both the 
extremely rich and poor are unwilling or unable to obey reason, and cannot act prudently. The 
grossly poor are malicious towards those who would rule adverse to their interests, while the 
very rich are ignorant and unwilling to rule properly due to their leisure and luxury (Pol. 
1295b15-34). Jefferson saw these gross economic disparities as violations of natural rights (to 
James Madison, October 28, 1785). Yet, importantly, he also saw them as "producing so much 
misery to the bulk of mankind" (to James Madison), that regimes characterized by it would be 
the farthest removed "from affection and a political community (Pol. 1295b24).  
In order to be properly self-governing, along with economic independence and general 
equality, citizens must also possess a capacity for prudence and an understanding of right rule. 
Inherent in prudence is a widening of individual perspectives to accommodate that of others, 
which itself is necessary in order to properly consider the common advantage. Only after 
possessing prudence -- or, only after becoming capable of proper deliberation -- can citizens 
understand right rule and act in accordance with it, in that citizens rule and are ruled in turn by 
"having someone look to their good, just as when ruling previously they looked to his" (Pol. 
1279a5-22). Jefferson's understanding of right rule within a competent citizenry fits well with 
Aristotle's understanding. When writing of the dangers of life-appointments of Senators, 
Jefferson argues that the legislators "might have in idea that they were at a certain period to 
return into the mass of the people and become the governed [again]... which might still keep 
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alive that regard to the public good that otherwise they might… be induced by their 
independence to forget" (to Edmund Pendleton, August 26, 1776). Inherent in Jefferson's 
concern is that these legislators, if made independent from the general citizenry's guidance, 
would not be inclined towards prudent partiality and a consideration of those things "conducive 
to living well in general" (NE 1140a25-32).  
This understanding of right rule is fundamental for the carrying out of proper republican 
self-governance. In line with this, Jefferson's educated citizenry would possess both refined 
hearts (the benevolent moral sense) and minds (the intellectual capacity for prudence).18  This 
would not only engage and promote public and private deliberation among citizens, but also the 
"feelings of sympathy, of benevolence… of justice, of love, [and] of friendship" (to Maria 
Cosway, October 12, 1786). These characteristics would inject meaning, and perhaps even 
efficiency, into the public attitudes and disposition necessary for deliberation and self-
governance. These amicable feelings that arise in Jefferson's citizenry can be understood as 
another form of the mutual self-respect -- the same that characterizes Aristotelian political 
friendship. Therefore, not only would Jefferson's republican citizenry possess "knowledge of rule 
over free persons from both points of view" (Pol. 1277b15-16), but they would also be notably 
characterized by "practical intelligence [prudence], virtue, and goodwill" (Rhet. 1378a6-9).  
Upon this look at Jefferson's ideal regime, we may now see that the instrumental features 
in producing Aristotelian political friendship do exist there. The citizenry of such a political 
society would indeed possess egalitarian attitudes. Their shared general economic equality, along 
with the capacity for prudence and right rule through their shared education, and a general 
attitude of benevolence and amicability between them as drawn out through the exercise of their 
                                               
18 See the letters to Maria Cosway, October 12, 1786; to George Wyth, August 13, 1786; to Thomas Law, 
June 13, 1786 
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moral sense, are all productive of expanded perceptions and outlooks that characterize mutual 
self-respect. Jefferson's republican citizenry may even be superior to Aristotle's hoi mesoi in this 
respect: it would have, as one of its "primary obligations," an aim to cultivate our natural moral 
sense of "peace, charity, and love to our fellow men" (to Benjamin Rush, April 21, 1803). From 
all of these things shared between an independent, egalitarian, educated people, they may then 
property deliberate and pursue their common wants and common aims. This is what Aristotle 
means when he claims that "like-mindedness [homonoia], therefore, appears to be political 
friendship" (NE 1167b2-3, NE 1155a23-27).  
Where would political friendship find itself expressed in Jefferson's regime? Like 
Aristotle, it has no one specific place wherein it blooms. Instead, political friendship, as found in 
egalitarian and benevolent attitudes of mutual self-respect, would find itself exercised in a 
similar way to the moral sense: within the deliberation and public obligations necessary to a self-
governing political society. It would go beyond only these institutional obligations, though, 
because of that very same moral sense. The Christian ethical ideas of benevolence, charity, love, 
and friendship towards our fellow citizens and neighbors would incline individuals within 
Jefferson's political society to expand or deepen their egalitarian attitudes. It is this expansion or 
deepening of our social duties, beyond institutional obligations, that led Jefferson to praise Christ 
for refining our natural moral sense with "the sublimest of eloquence" (to Benjamin Rush, April 
21, 1803).  
This like-mindedness, egalitarianism, goodwill, and political friendship between citizens 
would also set the two salient goals of Jefferson's republican regime within reach. A citizenry 
characterized by general economic equality, sharing an education in ethics and intellect, and 
exercising their benevolent social nature through self-governance, would find their liberty and 
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natural rights firmly secured. Likewise, they would have their good natures cultivated in line 
with the highest human good -- happiness. In reaching for these two goals, and cultivating 
harmony among benevolent political friends, Jefferson's ideal regime would best refine and 




Sec. VII - Conclusion 
Displayed within Jefferson's political philosophy are tensions between the general aims 
of modern liberalism and classical republicanism. The former aiming to protect the rights and 
liberties of individuals who comprise the political community, itself bonded by an artificial 
social contract, from external violations; the latter aiming to cultivate the more noble parts of our 
social nature, through direct participation, in a naturally emergent political society. These two 
views, when taken in such a way, would appear contradictory. Yet, I contribute substantively to 
debates in the literature19 by my showing that Jefferson's ideal political society, a direct 
manifestation of his political philosophy, would seek to reconcile this tension by combining what 
he held to be the most admirable and beneficial parts of each: only a well-aimed political society, 
designed for self-governance, could ensure the cultivation of our social natures while likewise 
securing our natural rights. In that way, he attempted to secure the mean.  
Along with this, Jefferson augmented this classical understanding of human nature and 
political society. He saw human nature as much more outwardly focused and amicable, 
characterized by natural sentiments of benevolence and charity. This Christian addition to a 
                                               
19 See Appleby 1976; Sheldon 1991; Yarbrough 2006. 
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classical understanding of human nature was aimed to incline citizens to reach "far beyond… in 
inculcating universal philanthropy…" (Benjamin Rush, April 21, 1803). Thus, the cultivation of 
virtue, in accord with our benevolent moral sense, became an primary objective for Jefferson's 
ideal political society. The ward democracies would nurture our moral and intellectual wellness, 
and habituate the corresponding virtues through obligatory political participation and social 
cooperation. If the interests of the individual and the regime, soundly calculated, are "inseparable 
from our moral duties” (Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1805), would this contradict a 
liberal emphasis on the protection of individual liberties? Jefferson thought not. With the 
prerequisites of economic, ethical, and intellectual independence and competence of citizens 
within the self-governing wards, Jefferson believed that his regime would be its own best 
defense against violations of natural rights (to Joseph C. Cabell, Feb. 2, 1816): Each competent 
citizen would best "judge for himself [of] what will secure or endanger his freedom" (to J. Tyler, 
May 26, 1810). 
The harmonization of supposedly opposing influences in Jefferson's political thought is 
perhaps best demonstrated with his understanding of happiness. For Aristotle, happiness is 
defined clearly as the "activity of the soul in accord with virtue… [over] a complete life" (NE 
1098a16-19): this is the exclusive teleological end of human life - that at which all things ought 
to aim. Jefferson proposed a similar definition, that "individual happiness [is] inseparable from 
the practice of virtue,"  and that such activity is "essential to the happiness of man" (to J. Correa 
de. Serra, April 19, 1814; to Benjamin Rush, April 21, 1803). Where Jefferson departs, due to 
the influences of modern liberalism, is in the individual liberty of each citizen to pursue 
happiness as they see fit. Citizens can live as they like, so long as they fulfill their obligations to 
political society, which is conducive to the Christian virtues that are essential to the individual 
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happiness of each. This marriage of liberalism of classicism is best displayed in the preamble to 
the Declaration: that all are endowed with the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness 
[emphasis mine] (The Declaration of Independence, 1776). Moreover, this project renews the 
possibility of future, more in-depth comparisons between Aristotle and Jefferson, about topics of 
perhaps even greater significance. After all, we have seen that, despite "analogy and difference, 
time and time again" (Lehmann 1947, 53), such comparisons are plausible -- and fruitful. 
We can now consider another question posed at the start: have we human beings moved 
beyond the ancients, and is there nothing else left to learn from them? To answer, we may look 
to Jefferson. Upon the ethical and political principles he sourced from the ancients, he 
contemplated with notable prudence what the best American regime ought to be composed of, 
and how it could compel its citizens towards virtue, benevolence, and harmony, while 
nevertheless offering them liberty and the security of their rights. It was this sentiment that 
caused him to write that the best regime ought to "lay the foundations of public happiness in 
wholesome laws, the execution of which alone remains for others…” (The Second Inaugural 
Address, March 4, 1805). Within this regime, foundationally classical and with important liberal 
freedoms, Americans would possess a distinctive type of freedom which was ours to dutifully 
maintain. By searching for Aristotelian political friendship (politikē philia) and the "political art" 
of prudence (phronēsis) (NE 1141a22) within Jefferson's political thought - and finding it - we 
can look to his political philosophy with a renewed perspective. Perhaps more importantly, we 
can use the high aims and sentiments of Jefferson's philosophy as a guidepost to measure our 
own political realities.  
Throughout this examination, we have discussed the ideal regimes of Aristotle and 
Jefferson; not those that exist in actuality. Political friendship, seen in Aristotle's regimes or 
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more amicably through Jefferson's addition of Christian benevolence, may be difficult to grasp 
from our contemporary context. What would it look like to look to each others' interests, and 
they to ours, as if we were considering our own interests? What would a harmonized political 
society look like, one of "undogmatic social unity" (Schwarzenbach 1996, 99), where 
togetherness is found not through coercion but through a genuine goodwill and desire to secure 
common wants and aims? Through this analysis of political friendship, its philosophical 
foundations, and the institutional components that give rise to it, we may see something that 
renews not only our perspective of Jefferson's America, but of our own. What is required of us to 
live within a republican democracy? Moreover, we must consider what is meant when we say 
political community, in reference to contemporary liberal democracies. That aside, our 
obligations to the political community -- if the nature and benefits of political friendship holds 
water -- must go far beyond the occasional vote or town hall attendance. We must, as individuals 
and as members of a community, genuinely endeavor to deliberate, harmonize, and secure our 
common wants and common aims. So, too, we must work to cultivate within ourselves (and the 
community) the intellect and goodness inherent in refined heads and hearts. To do this would 
allow us, as a community and as individuals, to reach towards the greatest good of all -- our 
happiness.  
These considerations are profound, as are their implications. They are too difficult to 
fully grapple with here, and their answers perhaps too obscure. Yet, deliberation alone can be 
generative and beneficial. Our examination political friendship can, least of all, show what an 
authentic, amicable, egalitarian political community in America could look like. It is something 












Appendix I: Aristotle 
 
The Nicomachean Ethics 
Book I, chapters 1-5, 7, 9, 13 
Book II, chapters 1-9 
Book III, chapters 
Book VI, chapters 1-13 
Book VII, chapters 1-4 
Book VIII, chapters 1-14 
Book IX, chapters 1-12 
Book X, chapters 6-8 
 
The Politics 
Book I, chapters 1-3 
Book II, chapters 1-12 
Book III, chapters 1-13 
Book IV, chapters 3-16 
Book V, chapters 1-4, 8-9 
Book VI, chapters 1-8 
Book VII, chapters 1-4, 7-10, 13-15 
Book VIII, chapters 1-3 
  
The Rhetoric 
Book I, chapters 3-9, 13-14 

















Appendix II: Thomas Jefferson 
 
Public Papers, Speeches, and Publications: 
A Declaration by the Representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress 
Assembled, 1776 (Jefferson's Draft) 
The Declaration of Independence, 1776 
 A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, 1778 
The Constitution of the United States of America, 1787 
Notes on the State of Virginia, Queries XVIII, XIX, 1787 
Second Inaugural Address, March 4, 1805 
 
Correspondence to: 
Edmund Pendleton, August 26, 1776 
Chastellux, June 7, 1785 
James Madison, October 28, 1785 
George Wythe, August 13, 1786 
Maria Cosway, October 12, 1786 
Peter Carr, with Enclosure, August 10, 1787 
John Adams, November 13, 1787 
James Madison, December 20, 1787 
Dr. Joseph Priestley, April 9, 1803 
Benjamin Rush, April 21, 1803 
John Tyler, May 26, 1810 
John B. Colvin, September 20, 1810 
John Adams, October 28, 1813 
P.S. DuPont de Nemours, April 24, 1816 
Francis W. Gilmer, June 7, 1816 
J. Correa de. Serra, April 19, 1814 
Thomas Law, June 13, 1814 
Peter Carr, September 7, 1814 
Joseph C. Cabell, Feb. 2, 1816 
John Taylor, May 28, 1816 
Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816 
John Holmes, August 15, 1820 
Jared Sparkes, February 4, 1824 
James Heaton, May 20, 1824 
Maj. John Cartwright, June 5, 1824 
 
44 







Aristide Tessitore. 2003. "Chapter 7, Legitimate Government, Religion, and Education: 
The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson." In History of American Political Thought, eds. 
Bryan-Paul Frost, Jeffrey Sikkenga. USA: Lexington Books. 
 
Appleby, Joyce. 1976. "Liberalism and the American Revolution." The New England 
Quarterly 49 (1):3-26. 
Aristotle, Robert C. Barlett, and Susan D. Collins. 2011. Nicomachean Ethics. Chicago, 
USA: Chicago University Press. 
Aristotle, and Carnes Lord. 2013. Politics. Chicago, USA: Chicago University Press. 
Aristotle, and Robin Waterfield. 2018. Rhetoric. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 
Bartlett, Robert C. 1994. "Aristotle's Science of the Best Regime." The American 
Political Science Review 88 (1):143-55. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2944887. 
Bickford, Susan. 1996. "Beyond Friendship: Aristotle on Conflict, Deliberation, and 
Attention." The Journal of Politics 58 (2):398-421. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2960232. 
Brewer, Talbot. 2005. "Virtues we can Share: Friendship and Aristotelian Ethical 
Theory." Ethics 115 (4):721-58. https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/430489. 
Danzig, Gabriel. 2000. "The Political Character of Aristotelian Reciprocity." Classical 
Philosophy 95 (4):399-424.  
Erkkila, Betsy. 2007. "Radical Jefferson." American Quarterly 59 (2):277-89. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40068463. 
Frank, Jill. 2005. A Democracy of Distinction: Aristotle and the Work of Politics. USA: 
Chicago University Press. 
Lehmann, Karl. 1947. Thomas Jefferson, American Humanist. New York, USA: The 
Macmillan Company. 
Lindsay, Thomas K. 1992. "Liberty, Equality, Power: Aristotle's Critique of the 




Lockwood, Thornton, and Thanassis Samaras, eds. 2015. Aristotle's Politics, A Critical 
Guide. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Maloy, J. S. 2009. "The Aristotelianism of Locke's Politics." Journal of the History of 
Ideas 70 (2):235-57. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40208102. 
McDowell, Gary L., and Sharon L. Noble, eds. 1997. Reason and Republicanism, 
Thomas Jefferson's Legacy of Liberty. USA: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 
Mulgan, R. G. 1977. Aristotle's Political Theory, An Introduction for Students of Political 
Theory. Oxford University Press: Oxford, UK. 
PARIS, CRYSTAL C. 2016. "Ancient, Modern, and Post-National Democracy:; 
Deliberation and Citizenship between the Political and the Universal." In On Civic 
Republicanism, eds. GEOFFREY C. KELLOW, NEVEN LEDDY: University of Toronto Press, 
89-116. 
Peterson, Merrill D., ed. 1984. Thomas Jefferson, Writings. New York, USA: Penguin 
Books USA. 
Ruderman, Richard S. 1997. "Aristotle and the Recovery of Political Judgment." The 
American Political Science Review 91 (2):409-20. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2952364. 
Schwarzenbach, Sibyl A. 1996. "On Civic Friendship." Ethics 107 (1):97-128. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2382245. 
Scorza, Jason A. 2004. "Liberal Citizenship and Civic Friendship." Political Theory 32 
(1) (Feb 1,):85-108. https://www.jstor.org/stable/4148170. 
Shalhope, Robert E. 1976. "Thomas Jefferson's Republicanism and Antebellum Southern 
Thought." The Journal of Southern History 42 (4):529-56. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2208005. 
Sheldon, Garrett W. 1991. The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson. Baltimore, 
USA: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Sherman, Nancy. 1987. "Aristotle on Friendship and the Shared Life." Philosophy and 
Phenomenological Research 47 (4):589-613. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2107230. 
Smith, Thomas W. 1999. "Aristotle on the Conditions for and Limits of the Common 
Good." The American Political Science Review 93 (3):625-36. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2585578. 
Wood, Gordon S. 1998. The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787. North 
Carolina, USA: University of North Carolina Press. 
Yack, Bernard. 2006. "Rhetoric and Public Reasoning, an Aristotelian Understanding of 
Political Deliberation." Political Theory 34 (4):417-38. https://www.jstor.org/stable/20452473. 
